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Abstract 
Humanity system of life is highly supported by maritime transport when circa 8 
thousand million people require about 8.800 million tons of merchandises by sea, going 
in some 105.000 merchant ships of over 100 GT, sailing every thinkable dangerous 
waters 365 days year 24 hours day. All that Enormous activity plus others different 
factors produce accidents, as is shown in an ascendant 1.7 rate related to ships lost 
with big number in life, cargoes losses, and pollution. That is why this study pretend to 
detect causes factors of maritime accidents, to try to reduce them, and with that target 
in mind it was tested the new theory of Induced Maritime Accidents, crossing its 
proposals with relevant sinister of different times and circumstances, as Andrea Doria, 
Torrey Canyon, Costa Concordia, among others. Those cases were re evaluated to 
establish the key points of such theory, as they are the Production Pressure, the Risk 
Homeostasis, technological advances and the rupture of safety margin. Cases studies 
gave as result the existence of referred key points, in a manner combined that the chain 
of events derived to the fatality, and more than that highlights the possibility that been 
suppressed to acceptable limits the production pressure or the risk homeostasis, a 
permissible safety margin were been maintained, avoiding catastrophe 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Resolution MSC.255 (84) of International Maritime Organization, IMO, (OMI, 2010) 
establish that a marine casualty means an event, or a sequence of events, that has 
resulted in any of the following which has occurred directly in connection with the 
operations of a ship:  
1. The death of, or serious injury to, a person;. 
2. The loss of a person from a ship; . 
3. The loss, presumed loss or abandonment of a ship; . 
4. Material damage to a ship; . 
5. the stranding or disabling of a ship, or the involvement of a ship in a collision; 
6. material damage to marine infrastructure external to a ship, that could seriously 
endanger the safety of the ship, another ship or an individual; or  
7. Severe damage to the environment, or the potential for severe damage to the 
environment, brought about by the damage of a ship or ships.  
 
However, a marine casualty does not include a deliberate act or omission, with the 
intention to cause harm to the safety of a ship, an individual or the environment. 
This match with Babylonian Hammurabi Code wrote between 1955 1912 BC when 
stabilising that the accident is not an intentional act: In the sentences meted out to each 
offense, the code distinguishes whether or not there is intentionality, and also: The 
penalty is increased if it has been done deliberately. (clasica, n.d.)  
2. DISSEMINATION OF ACCIDENTS 
In regard to the public knowledge of these accidents, previously, cases as Titanic, took 
more time to be disclosed, however at the present time, cases such as Prestige or Costa 
Concordia, among others, they do so in real time, which promotes a reaction of the 
public opinion more swift and forceful, and that, joined with the maritime transport 
system supports to a large extent the life forms of humanity, whose international trade is 
transported by more than 90 %, by sea (IMO, 2012, p. 7) some 8408 million tons of 
various loads transported in 2010 (UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2011, p.7) 
on board of 104304 = >100 GT merchant propelled ships, highlights the fact that this is 
not a system of which we can dispense with, and therefore it is essential to know the 
causes that motivate the marine casualties to minimize its recurrence. 
This core activity of the maritime transport has been adapting to commercial and 
technological requirements, transforming what it in the past it was considered by society 
as a safe activity, to an insecure and high-risk in the present. The modest size of the 
vessels of the past, in contrast to the enormous today, in themselves represent greater 
risk potential, either by the loss of lives and/or goods, environmental pollution, etc. 
Upcoming major technological advances to the ships to reduce the consumption of fuel, 
the use of liquefied gas as fuel, the hull lubrication by air to decrease the friction with 
the sea, in the bridge is already normal the use of integrated systems, Automatic 
Identification System, Long-range identification and tracking of ships, to electronic 
navigational charts, among others. 
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These technological advances assumptions to improve maritime safety probably are 
activated, as they did in the past, the adaptation and balance of the safety margin 
accepted by the operator (Homeostasis of risk) which could compromise for a period of 
time, the safety. (Montes de Oca & Martínez Marín, 2013, p. 42)  
3. FATAL STATISTICS & CASUISTRY 
The maritime accidents have left huge amounts of dead, in 1820 during the North Sea 
winter, more than two thousand ships foundered with the consequent loss of the lives of 
more than twenty thousand people (L., Boisson, 1928, p. 10), by then the United 
Kingdom (UK) adopted the Passengers Act, which led to the English Parliament to 
research on the causes of shipwrecks, focused on ten determinants, as the inadequate 
equipment, failures of construction, excess load or its inappropriate assurance, 
inadequate maintenance, incompetence of the Captain, etc. (Boisson opcit, p50). Later 
during 1848 France and the UK agreed to in writing the first regulating navigation at sea 
on the navigation lights, continuing with regulations to avoid collisions at sea. However, 
the reiteration of maritime accidents and multiple actions or regulations to minimize 
them, gender in the global maritime community, the need for their research and to 
identify causes and avoid as far as possible its recurrence. This has helped the 
international cooperation and the advent of the common ways to investigate them and in 
January 2010 came into force the Resolution MSC 255(84) that imposes mandatory 
internationally, the Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties. 
In spite of these efforts, however, the rate of losses of vessels has increased, from 1.3 in 
2006 to 1.7 in 2010 (relation of ships lost/total number of vessels =>100GT) (IMO 
document CWGSP12/3)  and the index of spills to the sea from 1970 to 2011, indicates 
that the 2% are product of fires or explosions, 2% due to collisions, groundings 3 %, 
hull failure 7 %, equipment failures 21%, and surprisingly 64% of the causes of such 
spills, it is for another reason or the cause is unknown (annual statistics from the 
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, ITOPF's) and even more, from 1989 
to 2010 were lost (totally) 4443 ships and 18189 lives as a result (UPC, 2012). (R. 
Montes de Oca, O.Marquez, Jesús Martínez, 2012) 
4. ANALYTICAL REVIEW & PROPOSALS 
Faced with this concern in various branches of industry, the scientific world has 
produced alternating thoughts, among them as indicated by Charles Perrow in his book 
NORMAL ACCIDENTS (Living with High-Risk Technologies) (Perrow, 1999) which 
presents the theory of why accidents occur and some of them inevitably due to the fact 
that the productive systems that builds society, are too complex and their components or 
parts can interact in unexpected ways, thus leading to the accident. He also claims that 
with this new approach, it could be finalized with charges to persons and/or wrong 
factors, as commonly happens in the present, and also stop the attempts to repair the 
systems in a way that only make them more risky. (Montes de Oca & Martínez Marín, 
2013, p. 43) 
It is based on the fact that there isn't a good management of high-risk technologies, 
which the patient research of many disasters proves that in a certain time no one knew 
what was happening in reality, and even though they acted with the best practice, the 
results were worse. Highlights the gap between the human being and the technology 
(where the operator is left behind in the understanding of the given system). Perrow 
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concludes, that the true cause of the Normal Accident is the complexity of the system 
because all the failures may be small in themselves and each to have a backup, but on 
the whole, it is their interaction (complex coordination of failures) that explains the 
accident, and these occur because the system is complex. (Montes de Oca & Martínez 
Marín, 2013, p. 43) 
According to our interpretation of Perrow, (adding the risk homeostasis) develops this 
Figure representing a possible sequence toward the accident. (Figure 1)  
 
Figure 1: Normal Accidents Sequence 
 
Source: Author Reynaldo Montes de Oca 
Another production of the scientific world that we might consider, are failures of design 
raised by Henry Petroski (Design paradigms, case histories of error and judgment in 
engineering) (Petroski, 2010) or modifications to the original design that might 
influence the failures, and negatively impacting on the couplings of some of the parts of 
the system pointed out by Perrow, making them strongly bound or rigid, what would 
facilitate the generation of unexpected or unknown interactions. So, we can assume the 
matrix of Perrow, enhanced by the vision of Petroski and this lead to the wrong mental 
construction of the operator and then take the wrong decision (although the operator 
was thought to be correct) and consequently detonate the sinister. (Figure 1) 
Recalling the collision in July 1956 of passenger ships Stockholm and Andrea Doria, it 
might be clear to us that if the ships had not had radar, the Andrea Doria has sailed at a 
slower rate in the dense fog prevailing, and none of the two has produced such changes 
of course. In the meantime the presence of radars and detection one each other, then the 
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speed remained high, and in ships approximation both operators, generated mental 
images erroneous to the reality and consequently manoeuvred toward the collision, 
although they tried to avoid it. 
In considering the sinister of the oil tanker Torrey Canyon in March 1967 that ran 
aground and break his hull with the consequent total loss of the ship and its cargo spill, 
generating this dreadful pollution in the waters around the semi-submerged reef Seven 
Stones, with Dietrich Dörner´s theory (The Logic of Failure, Recognizing and Avoiding 
Error in Complex Situations) (Dörner) we could consider that there was the decisions of 
the Captain of the oil tanker, when taking an unusual route and not recommended in 
defeat toward the port of Milford Haven, besides accepting as true the position given by 
bridge Pilot in the approach to the reef, as the cause of the catastrophe. 
With Henry Petroski´s theory, we might want to consider that was the modification of 
the physical characteristics of the ship's hull (lengthening for greater load capacity) 
leading to the loss of manoeuvrability due to that the rudder is not restructured for the 
new size of the vessel, which in the end caused the incident to not be able to fall on the 
port side quickly and avoid the reef. 
With Charles Perrow´s theory, we would consider that still so many commercial 
pressures and inaccuracy of the equipment that you've set up a gap in the dynamics of 
navigation that concluded in disaster.  
It should be noted that in all theoretical scenarios of this case, the mental image wrong 
was present. 
We can also infer that the bridge operators in the luxurious and ultra-modern passenger 
ship Costa Concordia, generated, believed and decided according erroneous mental 
images, which allowed his ship will contact the submerged rock. (Montes de Oca & 
Martínez Marín, 2013, p. 44) 
Just thinking in the last exposed cases, allows us to glimpse something prior to the act 
itself, had accumulated and inter linking with the consequent reduction of the 
appropriate margin of safety, to the point of inducing decisions that led to the accident. 
(Table 1) 
If focussing on this final phase (decision) we can get closer to Dietrich Dörner theory in 
which he said that we are so prone to make mistakes; our brains are not fundamentally 
defective; quite simply, we have developed bad habits. When we fail to solve a 
problem, we do so by the tendency to make a mistake here, a small error beyond, and 
these accumulate, thus contributing to fail. Although he further maintains that the 
violation of safety standards by the operator is due to the fact that frequently has already 
violated before (negative reinforcement) it is well that Dorner postulates the complexity 
and operational intelligence. So in summary, the causes of our mistakes when handling 
complex systems are: the slowness of our thinking and the small amount of information 
that we can process in a given time, our tendency to protect our sense of competence, 
the limited capacity of income flow of information to our memory, and to our tendency 
to focus only on the immediate problems. 
We have so that the human being is to some extent lags behind in the technological 
advances, and as a possible reaction the operator acts to balance its area of conformity / 
satisfaction (risk´s homeostasis) which to my way of seeing is not another thing that 
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modify the Risk (increasing), by the way of the Margin of Safety (downwards) 
(formerly did not have radar on board and maintained highly careful attitude, while 
having them, increases the speed, or changes in direction).  To this end, the proposal of 
the Slow Shipping to retrieve a greater margin of safety, lost through the rapid 
technological progress, the homeostasis of risk in combination with the pressures of 
production, or in other words, keep the previous preventive attitudes (when the risk was 
greater without present technology) in conjunction with the positive technological 
advances in the decline of the risk.  In this way avoiding failures (increasing the margin 
of safety by lowering the pressure of production with the Slow Shipping) could be 
generated sufficient time to adapt persons and systems to avoid errors in complex 
situations, which require that the design of such systems taking advantage of our natural 
talent of perception, presenting our attention to the precise information that we require 
at the exact moment. 
 
5. THE THEORY OF THE INDUCED ACCIDENTS 
This leads me to try to launch the configuration of a new theory, initially named as 
Induced Accidents, (Montes de Oca, 2013) based on the fact that accidents occur 
motivated to the infringement, decrease or absence of an acceptable margin of safety, 
generated among others due to the pressures of production, technological progress and 
the risk homeostasis (Figure 1 & 2) in an at least two of three combination.  
As seen in Figure 1, human being (individual part of a ship crew) is doing his job on 
board to reach target production with safety. What happens (first stage) is that in a 
particular moment these production pressures arise, pushing to more risky decisions, as 
per example to change a route with plenty room for a dangerous path because of 
thinking in an early arrival to profit the tide, or to don´t reduce speed, or to don´t make a 
clear change of bearing with enough time because of trying to maintain the schedule, or 
to don’t use in parallel generators or helm mechanism in some special circumstances 
because thinking in save paying fuel payments or overtime, or because of the fact that 
these equipment were not 100% available due to poor maintenance. But what reason 
allows a person agree to take these risky decisions? Well, because each person 
(Routinely the Master, Chief Engineer, personnel in watch) have his own individual 
capability to accept risk, ICRSR (Figure 1, Second stage), what we shall call individual 
comfort safety range to accept risk, or just: Comfort to the Risk, being that ICRSR in a 
normal situation in a well-trained crew is maintained within a range of preventive and 
precautionary. This range of comfort to the risk, it can be disturbed by both the 
pressures of production such as the sense of greater safety generated by technological 
advances, for example when the advent of radar, also appeared the super power of the 
vision even in thick fog or seeing through darkness.   
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 Figure 1: Homeostasis of Risk 
 
Source: Author Reynaldo Montes de Oca 
 
After receiving the influence from one or both of these factors (production pressure, 
technological advance) we arrived at the stage two. This variation of comfort to the Risk 
range is so called Homeostasis of the Risk (Balance before the feeling of risk). 
When in this second stage, the individual comfort to the risk range became bigger (so 
person accept more risk in a comfort way), it means to that person he will accept a 
smaller operational margin of risk (Third Stage), which will take us closer to the risk 
with the consequent increased likelihood of the occurrence of the incident. (Figure 2) 
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5.1 HOMEOSTASIS 
The concept of homeostasis was created by Claude Bernard, often regarded as the father 
of physiology, and published in 1865. 
It is a characteristic of a system, either open or closed, attributed to a living organism, 
(biological or social). This trend to balance allows them to regulate the internal or 
external environment to maintain a stable condition and constant that in our case of the 
proposed theory of induced accident we shall call as an individual comfort zone 
(Comfort to the Risk). The multiple adjustments of dynamic balance and self-regulating 
mechanisms make the homeostasis possible. (Bransiforte, 2009) 
5.1.1 PSYCHOLOGICAL HOMEOSTASIS 
The term was introduced by W. B. Cannon in 1932, appoints the general trend of any 
organism to the restoration of internal balance each time it is altered. These internal 
imbalances that can occur both in the physiological level and psychological, are 
produced by a timely damage or because of a need. In this way, an organism's life can 
be defined as a constant search for balance between his needs and his satisfaction which 
we have named in this proposal of theory of (Induced Accident) as the individual range 
of comfort to accept risk. Any action aimed at the search of the balance is, in the strict 
sense, behaviour. 
Interaction between animal and environment: responses to changes: Normally, to 
alterations in the environment, an animal responds with one of the three possible 
answers: avoidance, conformity or regulation. This last is the one that has received more 
attention; in fact, one of the main themes of the physiology is the study of the 
mechanisms that are used by the organism to maintain a stable internal environment.  
Avoidance: minimize the internal variations using some behavioural escape mechanism 
that allows them to avoid environmental changes, either space (looking for 
microhabitats not stressful like caves, burrows; or on a larger scale, migration) or 
temporary (hibernate, drowsiness), As example from our case, when watch at the bridge 
avoids issuing contrary to the opinion of the captain when he commands the manoeuvre. 
Conformity: the internal environment of the animal changes in parallel with the external 
conditions. There may be a functional compensation with the acclimation or the 
acclimatisation, recovering from the previous functional speed to change. Regulatory: a 
disturbance triggers compensatory actions that keep the internal environment relatively 
constant. 
5.2 Risk: 
Risk is defined as the combination of the probability of occurrence of an event and its 
negative consequences. The factors that compose it are the threat and vulnerability 
(CIIFEN, 2010) 
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 Figure 2: Induced Accidents / Risk and Safety Margin 
Source: Author Reynaldo Montes de Oca 
 
Margin of Safety up and down (See Figure 2): Increase and decrease of margin of 
safety, because of technological progress and the risk´s Homeostasis of the operator, 
who perceive the higher margin due to technological progress, then decreases with his 
more risky actions. (Montes de Oca & Martínez Marín, 2013, p. 45) 
a: Reduction of the Margin of Safety by homeostasis of the operator with the 
consequent increase of the Risk  
b: Reduction of the Margin of Safety by the increase in the production pressure with the 
consequent increase of the Risk 
In cases 1 and 2, the safety margin was enough to make the system will recover, while 
in case 3 the operator´s risk Homeostasis in combination with a production pressure 
increase, decreased the margin of safety to the point of deleting it thereby undermining 
the system, causing the disaster. 
There are many causes that could lead to the disaster; show as blue rectangles (See 
Figure 3). It could be failures of design or redesign (D(R)), ones so called immediate 
cause (I), proximate cause (P), root cause (RC), etc. (Figure 3) 
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Figure 3: Induced Accidents 
 Source: Author Reynaldo Montes de Oca 
 
The ones we are talking about are from Production Pressure (PP), Technological 
Advance (TA), Homeostasis of Risk (HR), circumstances or events not very tied 
(NVT), or very strong united (VSU).  As told before HR can be generated by the PP 
and/or TA, so in a first consequence HR vary to accept an individual wide range of 
comfort to the risk, and in a second consequence, to a shorter operational margin to risk, 
that in some cases lead to the disaster. (Figure 3) 
The technological progress makes us feel safer and then the operator actuates until that 
feeling reach to the level of previous risk, with catastrophic consequences already 
known. 
5.3 GIVING BASES FOR THE THEORY PROPOSAL 
The study within the three theories of accidents of the authors Perrow, Petroski and  
Dörner, have been carried out with a vision for epistemological to establish a specific 
structural base on the applicable concept to all of them. The same validation will have to 
be done with the theory proposal (Induced Accidents). 
As planned, on the methodology of scientific research programs, from Imre Lakatos, in 
which there is a structure composed of: Strong Core, where reside the basic assumptions 
or general hypotheses of the theory, centre from which rotates the mentioned theory. 
Protective Belt, with hypothesis assistants, definitions, basic conditions that serve to 
describe the uniqueness of the situation, since the basic assumptions contained in the 
217
Safety and Security
nucleus are insufficient to predict or explain details. So that the belt is responsible for 
defending the core to be distorted.  Positive Heuristics, which represents the operational 
techniques, mathematics with which one can develop the research program on a 
methodology to enable it to explain and predict in cases before the reality of the 
proposed scenario.  Negative Heuristic, which puts the framework of what not to do 
because it is in conflict with the strong core (Lakatos, 1978 pp. 13, 66). 
Subsequent to that part of the filter parameters of Lakatos, which made it possible to 
accept or not theories, then selected contrast them; we take cases of marine casualties 
for based on them, begin to experience the search for causes.  
The disaster of TORREY CANYON, in which after a sequence of events that inter 
reacted unexpectedly, bridge operators (we assume) generated an unrealistic picture of 
the reality that once they realized and tried to correct, it was already too late. By 
applying the principles set forth in these theories we perceive that the incident is 
interpreted differently, depending on the precepts of the theory used. Not excluding 
each other, but rather, in my view, complementing each other. And so going deepen in 
these theories and begun to build and to propose one of our own, as has been outlined in 
this study, the theory of induced accidents, motivated to the treatment given (or not 
given) to the margin of safety, in which not necessarily the factors involved are in the 
order plotted, these can happen or interact or interconnect, in a different order, free.       
(Figure 4), as well as infer that the erroneous image was present as a factor, through the 
theory proposal, we can also observe how was violated the safety margin to a point to 
be unrecoverable and the accident occur (in spite of the effort, in extremis, carried out 
by the captain to evade the obstacle). 
Graph 4: Induced Accident / Costa Concordia  
 
Source: Author Reynaldo Montes de Oca 
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For validation, the theory proposal of the induced accidents, suggests that: 
5.3.1 STRONG CORE:  
That the accidents are built hard by its protagonists (and/or predecessors) without them 
being truly aware of this; 
That this construction of the accident is based on the decrease of the margin of safety 
desirable; 
That accidents happen because the margin of safety decreases to an intolerable point that 
enables us to reach the strip of risk, materializing the sinister (or quasi-sinister, if a 
successful last second action); 
Such a reduction of the margin of safety is product mainly (not exclusively) of the 
interaction of the pressures of production, the homeostasis of the risk, and 
technological progress (two of three at least). 
5.3.2 PROTECTIVE BELT:  
The events or actions (that weaken the safety margin real or that increase the real risk) 
(not the actors still truly aware of this) will occur before or during the phase between 
the conceptual and the regular operations of the case which is concerned; overwhelming 
and entering a stage of sudden emergency that leads to the quasi-sinister (if mediate any 
providential action last second) or irreversibly the accident; 
The existence of a network of faults (factors that undermine the safety margin) that 
accumulated tuned violate suddenly the safety margin; 
The safety margin does not appear as a primary factor of decisions, in the chained 
actions toward the accident. 
5.3.3 POSITIVE HEURISTICS:  
The scope of calculation and determination of the level of risk in setting the margin of 
safety associated with a given scenario; 
The actions/decisions, training, skills, abilities, capabilities, environment, production 
requirements, health, fatigue, etc. Method: 1. -establish risk level 2. -establish wide 
safety margin 3. -set normatively 4. -set them on the conscience of the protagonists 5. -
set them in the culture of the company; 
Set the safety margin as a primary factor of priority in operational decisions. 
5.3.4 NEGATIVE HEURISTICS:  
When the intervening events or actions that lead to sinister are carried out with the 
intent to cause harm, may not be considered in this theory of induced accidents. 
Looking at the foundations of the induced accidents theory proposal, you can highlight 
the concrete fact that the decisions taken in the approach to the sinister have arguments 
or databases that of undesirable and unconscious way, thus denying the reality that 
decision makers are living and coming increasingly. For this reason this theory points to 
a specific rationale, firm, and accurate for those decision-making in such circumstances 
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of much information and time restricted to decide; as it was to rely on the safety margin 
built, or set it to play previously. 
As well it should never Costa Concordia have such a degree of proximity to the coast, 
or Andrea Doria wait so approximation to decide its route, or Torrey Canyon will lead 
through the restricted passage, or Titanic maintain speed. 
6. CASE STUDY  
Ship: CS Costa Concordia - Details of the incident: 4229 people were on board – Event 
Type: Contact, Break, Loss of all Power – Hour/Date: January 13 2012 to 9:45:07PM 
(VDR) – Accident Location: contact against rock "Le Scole", Giglio´s Island, 
Mediterranean Sea – Italy – Position: LAT. 42 ° 22 ' 20N - LONG. 10 ° 55' 50E – 
Weather/Sea conditions: ROUGH - NE4; Wind 17Knts E-NE, Visibility Partly cloudy 
to good. - Operations: In Navigation from Civitavecchia to Savona – Ship Affected 
area: Hull´s left side at the stern - Implications: very serious accident, 32 people were 
killed or missing, 157 injured, of whom 20 required medical care in hospital, total loss 
of the Ship. (MIT, 2012) 
This report, summarizes the human element (whose key members of the crew showed a 
poor technical expertise) is the root cause in the accident, both in its first phase, as 
determined by the non-conventional actions that led to contact with the rock, as well as 
in the 2nd part of the management of the overall emergency later. (For Induced 
Accidents theory, we will only take into account the 1st phase of the sinister, "contact 
with the rock') 
According to the verified evidence, it is established that Costa Concordia on the 13 
January 2012 at the time of his departure from the port of Civitavecchia, fulfilled 
completely with all of the safety of life at sea international convention requirements 
applicable. During the crucial phase prior to impact, in which successive actions that 
gave rise to the incident when the captain who guided the ship toward restricted shallow 
waters, and then a very small space in a parallel path to, and in a perpendicular too close 
to the coast by changing the course of navigation in a way very soft with the rudder to 
generate a small variation and leisurely pace of the course, but at the same time very 
wide. 
• So it can establish that the ship had sailed with all its margin of safety (figure 2 
yellow stripe). However, it is observed the soft manoeuvre of Captain.  
• a – View from induced accidents theory (IAT): it involves the ignorance of the 
danger that was stalking and which subsequently is expected to converge. These 
actions assist to decrease the margin of operational safety. 
6.1 IN REGARD TO THE ORGANIZATION, IDENTIFIES THE FOLLOWING 
PROBLEMS: 
• While the ship is heading quickly toward the coast, the Captain took the helm with 
sufficient time to enable it to have corrected the dangerous course on which the ship 
progressed, (not having corrected the manoeuvre represents an aggravating factor in 
his nautical conduct); 
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• b- (IAT): allowing the ship forward toward the danger without any action to counter 
it, this is consuming the safety margin up to decrease it to an intolerable point. 
The difficulties of the captain to read the radar (because at the time the lack of the 
reading lenses); c - (IAT): if he does not know with precision (but assume that he knew) 
the location of the intervening elements (Ship/coastline) sailing now by his own image 
(unreal) of the scenario. Here we are in front of the decline of the margin of safety due 
to two reasons: 1. - ignore locations and 2. - Homeostasis of risk in the Captain 
overrating his control over the situation and continue with his navigation route. 
• The use of navigational charts totally inadequate and the inappropriate use of the 
navigation systems;   d - (IAT): Not knowing with precision (but assume that he 
knew) the location of the intervening elements (Ship/coastline) sailing now by his 
own image (unreal) of the scenario. We can see now the decline of the margin of 
safety by: 1. - which is, or represent homeostasis of risk in the Captain when 
overestimated his capacities and feeling in control of the situation ignoring to verify 
positions. 2-Allow this condition reinforces the idea of the presence of risk 
homeostasis in the Captain to sustain decisions only in the belief of his expertise (by 
perhaps feel comfortable with an individual range of increased risk accepted and a 
safety operational margin declined) and did not corroborate ship position with its 
team of bridge. This certainly puts yet another link in the progressive reduction of 
the safety margin. 
• Captain distraction due to the existing presence upon arrival at the bridge, people of 
the department of hospitality and the telephone conversation sustained by one of 
them with a colleague from ashore; e. -(IAT): Allow this situation implies the 
assumption that it had already happened before and it looks normal to them, also that 
the approximation to Giglio was not considered a restricted manoeuvre but a 
navigation at open sea. Both of these considerations contribute to the decline of the 
operational margin of safety that should be, due to waste of precious moments to 
realize the true situation, on the other hand the condition of normal navigation 
instead of manoeuvre conditions did not promoted the best attention from the staff of 
navigation on the bridge. In our view because of an increased comfort to risk range 
of the Master and perhaps of all the bridge team on watch (Homeostasis of risk). 
• Captain orders given to the helmsman, assigning a course to follow, instead of telling 
the angle of the rudder. f. -(IAT): Implies that the helmsman seek (to his own 
knowledge and understanding, at their own pace) to follow the course dictated by the 
Captain, while that of the Captain having ordered by position of the rudder, was 
direct order in condition for manoeuvre to be made directly and without any delay, 
which would place the ship on the course quickly. It also notes that the captain did 
not earn greater danger and therefore sailed comfortably. So the safety margin is 
diminished with this form of sailing in these conditions and reveals the possible risk 
homeostasis in the Captain showing serenity when facing the facts and his control 
over them. 
In regard to the specific requirements learned of the procedures of the international 
safety management code, it is clear the failure of: 
• The conduct of the attention to the watch on the bridge on the distraction of the 
motivated staff to the presence of strangers in the bridge; g. - (IAT): Above-
mentioned as promoted by the captain to navigate as if it were in the open sea, 
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which, however, did not prevent bridge´s human team, to maintain a conduct to a 
great deal of attention to the navigation environment (perhaps the avoidance, as one 
of the three possible answers in the physiological homeostasis: avoidance, 
conformity or regulation); Coupled with the aforementioned distraction. This helped 
a lot to allow the gradual decline and increasingly alarming of the margin of safety. 
• In addition the fails in regard to the verification of the position of the vessel, which 
was never done; h. - (IAT): Exposed reflects the attitude of confidence of the 
Captain in the knowledge of the area and control of the situation (he supposed to 
have) generated by the possible risk homeostasis that he was invaded with. 
In this context looks clear anomalous the attitude of the Master not to check the original 
navigation plan (already failed as a result of the rapprochement to half nautical mile (0.5 
nm) using a navigational chart totally inadequate) and go beyond the point of rotation 
provided without checking the actual distance to the coast (despite that was supported by 
the navigational equipment and bridge team). The audio recordings in conjunction with 
the collected evidence (2nd/3rd/1st deck officers, do not match) show the differences of the 
human team of navigation with the government of the ship. Their passive attitude is 
reprehensible, and even the greater authority (after the Captain) the first mate (still in his 
watch) alerted or urged the captain to close/speed up the turn of the ship, nor did he give 
information of the imminent danger in spite of the fact that before the arrival (of the 
Captain) to the bridge had been sharply criticized and defined as a true madness the 
decision to follow that route so close to the coast. (IAT): In regard to the attitude of the 
first mate, it is clear that for this manoeuvre it was not a open sea case, however did not 
make any warning to the Captain, the reasons for such attitude we do not know (perhaps 
the avoidance, physiological homeostasis answer), but the fact of silent entity not 
contradicting the captain, the owner of command, can be between them. This contributed 
to the subsequent decline of the safety margin. 
It is also reprehensible the bad use of the three decks officers on the bridge, during the 
phase of the watch of the first officer, such as when the Captain arrived at the bridge 
and took command of the vessel. Even if in the latter scenario, the first officer could 
have used the staff of the bridge to warn of the dangerous rapprochement to the coast, 
rather than simply repeat the commands of the captain at the helm, or change the speed 
(perhaps the conformity, physiological homeostasis answer). 
Figure 5: Costa Concordia / Safety Margin 
 
 Source: (MIT, 2012) & the Author 
  
 
COSTA 
PP+HR 
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The Costa Concordia were complying her normal production activity but in point (A), 
instead of turning to starboard and maintain its margin of safety, she decided to continue 
straight ahead approaching Giglio coast (risk area) and reducing the acceptable safety 
margin in search of the previously calculated new turning point (B) (now located in a 
small safety margin) and not respectful continued her navigation up to another turning 
point (C) extremely close to the coast which totally violated the safety margin; After 
this, and with the failure of last second reaction to avoid the catastrophe, this became 
inevitable. (See Figure 5) 
The production Pressure and Homeostasis of Risk (PP+HR) cone represents the 
combination of factors which possibly led to the crew in charge of navigation to take 
those very wrong decisions. When production pressure push to salute Giglio it turn to a 
bigger individual risk comfort range accepted by the Master, and as a consequence to a 
smaller operational safety margin (SM). Then after the breakdown of the SM the 
catastrophe befell (See Figure 5). 
Figure 6: Costa Concordia sequence of the loss of the margin of safety 
 
Source: The Author: R Montes de Oca 
Figure 6 show a sequence of how the operational safety margin is loss when the 
decision maker (crew in charge of navigation) changed for a bigger than normal their 
individual comfort range of acceptance of risk, possibly as a result of the pressure of 
production by greet Giglio (homeostasis of risk), and as a result allow a safety margin 
very small to unacceptable limits (See point 2 of Figure 1) 
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Table 1: Induced Accident Analysis 
Case 
Study 
Production 
Pressure 
Technological 
Advance Risk Homeostasis Results 
Induced 
Accident 
Costa 
Concordia 
Approach to Giglio 
coast  
(Yes) 
Ultramodern 
vessel 
(Advantages 
Not  used) 
Decide upon a individual intuitive 
navigation type of the open sea without 
use of ship´s modern facilities, nor 
order condition of restricted 
manoeuvre, do not require support of 
staff at the bridge, accept excessive 
proximity to the coast. 
Two of 
three 
(PP & 
HR) 
YES 
Torrey 
Canyon 
To profit tide on 
arrival march 18th 
or must wait till the 
24th to enter 
Milford Haven – 
Much time on 
board without 
vacations – 
Lengthening of ship 
(Yes&Yes&No) 
Automatic 
steering 
(Yes) 
Change from a plenty room navigation 
route to a dangerous path 
Three 
of three 
(PP&T
A&HR) 
YES 
Andrea 
Doria / 
Stockholm 
To maintain arrival 
time  - To take a 
destination shorter 
route (Yes & (Yes) 
Presence of 
Radar on both 
vessels 
(Yes) 
Both parties acceptance of an 
inadequate passing distance (too close) 
-   Do not consider two ships 
navigations as a system -  Do not slow 
speed - Do not make a clear change of 
bearing  with enough time 
Three 
of three 
(PP&T
A&HR) 
YES 
Source: (Cahill, 1992, p. 197)  (Richard A, 2002, pp. 3,4)  and analysis from authors 
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